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Introduction
The word “ethos” occurs for the first time in the Iliad (6, 511). Homer tells us about a
wild horse that struggles against the chains that keep him captive and, once he breaks
loose, gallops until he finds his ethos – a place where he feels good, a place that gives
him identity. In this sense, ethos is a habitat. The values of research: inquiry about the
protection of personal data in epidemiology can be considered as a search for a scientific
ethos. Its author, Nicolas Lechopier, is a professor at the Claude Bernard University of
Lyon-1 (France), and formerly (2008–2009) a postdoctoral fellow at the University of
São Paulo (Brazil) in the Thematic Project “Origins and significance of technoscience:
on relations among science, technology and society”.
Merton’s classic formulation of the scientific ethos as a set of norms, “univer-
salism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism (...), expressed in
the form of prescriptions, proscriptions, preferences and permissions” (Merton, 1973,
p. 268-9) lies behind the author’s considerations on ethics and science. This ethos, a
“habitat” where scientists share a common set of epistemic and ethical values and the
same goals for science, presupposes that a demarcation can be made between good and
bad science, and it provides conditions for scientists to reach consensus in their judg-
ments of the epistemic worth of certain hypotheses. The author’s own account of scien-
tific ethos goes beyond Merton’s; it rejects the separation of epistemic and ethical values,
and contextualizes any demarcation between good (authentic) and bad (pseudo-) science.
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Lechopier arrives at his account of “scientific ethos” by way of an in-depth “epis-
temological and ethical inquiry” (p. 20) into the deliberations of the French commit-
tee, cctirs (Consulting Committee for the Treatment of Information in Health Re-
search). This committee deals with the ethics of research involving human beings. It is
charged with “giving an opinion – consultative – about the methodology of the projects
of research, ensuring that the protocol of research is of good quality from a scientific
point of view and that the personal data collected are indeed necessary for properly
conducting the research” (p. 135). Lechopier devotes his attention to research in epi-
demiology, the field in which research is conducted on the factors that influence the
distribution and variation of health-related phenomena among populations, e.g., phe-
nomena connected with the efficacy of specified drugs and the risk factors for diseases.
He analyses the evaluations made by cctirs of protocols shaping research projects in
this field – and explores issues about demarcation that arise in these evaluations.
Lechopier points out, “as in all empirical sciences, epidemiological research is
based on data”; and he continues, “however, most of the data that are relevant to epi-
demiology are not like [data in] other fields” (p. 17). The distinctive character of these
data comes from the fact that epidemiological research involves human beings and that,
to some extent, personal data must play a role in this research. Personal data, in this
context, may include a wide range of information, from professional activity, through
economic data and geographical location, to blood and genetic samples. Where per-
sonal data are used there is always a risk of failing to respect the right to individual
privacy. Hence, according to the author, the production and use of files with personal
data may be “epistemologically dangerous” (p. 74). Even if a person cannot be identi-
fied (if the data are, e.g., statistical, from the census of a country), “computational
methods would allow their identification in a work analogous to that of a police investi-
gator that matches up different information to find the singular case he trails” (p. 75).
Not only does the use of personal data constitute a threat to individual privacy, but also
the percentage of errors in administrative files is quite high (p. 62). Given that per-
sonal data may be used to represent citizens before the law and to affect their reputa-
tion in society, the quality of the data, as well as their usage, is particularly important.
The protocols of research projects are selected in accordance with rules that pro-
vide cognitive justification for their approval. By preventing errors when obtaining and
using them, the rules ensure the integrity and quality of data; the protocols also con-
tain measures to protect the data from abusive or unnecessary use (p. 61). Lechopier
asks: on what grounds does cctirs demarcate scientific from non-scientific consid-
erations, and thus appraise the sound methodological credentials of the protocols? What
epistemic (cognitive) values are deployed for evaluating the scientific worth of a pro-
tocol? Is its worth sufficient to justify that using personal data is essential to the re-
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search shaped by it, and hence (according to the regulations under which cctirs func-
tions, ch. 5) that it is justified to use it in the research, despite the risks that using it
may occasion for protecting the right to individual privacy? When addressing these
questions, Lechopier argues that the domains of epistemic and ethical values cannot
be separated, since “these domains are articulated simultaneously, both in the pro-
duction and in the evaluation [of a protocol of research]” (p. 264). Thus, “the idea of
an ethos adequate for scientific research invites us to go beyond the ethical/scientific
cleavage, to annul the source of conflicts of interests, and to contribute to question the
modalities in which the research can be inscribed in the social” (p. 23).
Since personal data must be used in epidemiological research, prior attention
needs to be given to the legitimacy of its use and to the cognitive worth of the research.
Risks that may arise from making personal data public need to be considered, and it
needs to be ascertained that the research framed by a research protocol serves scien-
tific or epistemic interests and not just commercial or industrial ones, e.g., those as-
sociated with the marketing of pharmaceutical products (cf. ch. 8). Lechopier devel-
ops these and associated themes throughout the book. In the course of doing so he
explores the range of disciplines involved in epidemiological research, the contexts of
the research and its applications, and he identifies three kinds of values that are used
to evaluate research protocols: epistemic, ethical and periepistemic. The outcome is a
significant original contribution to the debate over the role of values in science.
1 Demarcation at a crossroads:
towards methodological pluralism
Epidemiology, as Lechopier explains, lies “at the crossroads of many disciplines that
are located in biomedicine (toxicology, pathology etc.), in mathematics (statistics,
probabilities), social sciences (sociology, economy etc.) and health (clinical, public
health)” (p. 17). In it, scientific research and practices to protect and improve public
health come together, with the consequence that observational programs and invasive
procedures are not clearly distinguished from each other. This results in the objects of
investigation, methods, aims and practices of epidemiology being heterogeneous, and
in the blurring of the boundaries between disciplines and levels of investigation.
The boundaries between research and action are also blurred. On the one hand,
epidemiological research aims to obtain knowledge that has some degree of generality:
epidemiology, as a discipline of objective knowledge, does not aim to state what
ought to be desirable or not, but to state what is. Its role is to answer questions
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about sanitary issues: How many? Who? Why? What risk factors? What conse-
quences? etc. These concern matters of fact, not of values (p. 46).
On the other hand, epidemiology aims for practical, utilitarian knowledge (p. 47) that
can be used to inform interventions that efficaciously address specific problems of
public health. In turn, interventions inevitably reflect ethical value judgments, espe-
cially when we consider that ethically justified procedures themselves can sometimes
be invasive, since they may cause personal disturbances and problems to those who fill
in questionnaires (p. 35). In epidemiology, then, it is not clear that the fact-value di-
chotomy can be upheld; and this underlies another tension, that between decontex-
tualized and contextualized knowledge.
Identifying the boundaries between research and action often constitutes a prob-
lem for the appraisal of protocols, especially because some research projects have many
objectives or change their focus from research to action in the course of their conduct.
In order to illuminate the ambiguities that can arise here, Lechopier looks at the bor-
derline case of Action Research (p. 48-50, 267). Action Research is well exemplified
in “community-based participatory research”, a good example of which is the author’s
philosophical and ethnographical investigation of the communities that live on the edge
of the Tapajós River in the Brazilian Amazon region (cf. Lechopier, 2011). Commu-
nity-based participatory research projects have three fundamental characteristics: they
are contextualized and significant (locally appropriate and pertinent); they promote
the empowerment of the communities involved in the research; and, in them, rela-
tions between the community’s participants and researchers are equitable and hori-
zontal (Lechopier, 2011, p. 130-1). In them, quantitative epidemiological data (obtained
in analytical and descriptive research) inform preventive and corrective measures that
involve the participation of the affected population in public health activities. It fol-
lows that there is not a clear distinction between action and research, and consequently
ethical commitments and notions of justice that shape how scientists understand their
responsibilities may have impact that extends into the research projects. This does not
necessarily mean, however, that what is science cannot be to some extent demarcated
from what is not. Action lies within the researcher’s responsibility, and this requires
consideration of the direct and indirect consequences of proposed actions, and of the
available alternatives (cf. Lechopier, 2011, p. 134, 144). On the other hand, research
responds to “the intention of producing generalizable knowledge” (p. 49), and in order
to obtain theories with broad scope or generality, in a certain way it is decontextualized
from its local specificities. Provided that demarcation can be made between authentic
(legitimate) scientific research and other kinds of activities, and between good and
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bad science, one would expect that when experts provide cognitive justification of a
protocol, it would be a protocol of a research project that fits into what is properly de-
marcated as authentic and good science.
In a well-known work, Larry Laudan maintains that any proposal for the demar-
cation between authentic science and other kinds of activities is undermined in the
light of his arguments that no satisfactory answers can be given to the questions: “(1)
what conditions of adequacy should a proposed demarcation criterion satisfy? (2) Does
the criterion under consideration provide necessary or sufficient conditions, or both,
for scientific status?” (Laudan, 1996, p. 215). His arguments draw centrally upon his
analysis that the hypotheses that are well tested and considered to constitute scientific
knowledge exhibit “epistemic heterogeneity” (Laudan, 1996, p. 221): there are many
admissible methods for their derivation and justification, and these vary from case to
case, not permitting the identification of either necessary or sufficient conditions for
what constitutes scientific knowledge or the scientific activities that result in it. This
gives rise to the possibility that the soundness of certain methodological proposals may
be appraised in multiple ways. In similar vein, Lechopier argues for “methodological
pluralism” that is adequate to deal with the rich context variability of science, and hence
for the necessity of choosing to use methodologies that are adequate for gaining knowl-
edge that is relevant to the context and objective of research being pursued (p. 235) –
instead of appraising scientific methods as proper or not in the light of an abstract or
general cognitive value. Thus, any proposed criterion of demarcation that may come to
be used in epidemiology will be deployed in a dynamic context, “in a field of social
forces, in a struggle for legitimacy” (p. 280), in which scientific and ethical factors are
both entertained and mutually adjusted. The author endorses not only the need for
methodological pluralism (for the sake of obtaining all the relevant kinds of knowl-
edge that are needed in epidemiological research) and the multiplicity of kinds of ex-
planation, but also for characterizing the autonomy of scientific activity in a way that
does not lead to methodological decisions favoring some perspectives of social values,
rather than others.
2 Periepistemic value and expert divergence
When experts evaluate a protocol of epidemiological research, they take into account
both its social/ethical relevance and the adequacy of the design it provides for a re-
search program that is worthy of pursuit as an authentic scientific inquiry (p. 259).
Three different criteria can be pertinent to their evaluations:
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(a) humanitarian importance, judged in the light of values (shared by the
experts), which favors studies of public health that are responsive to com-
mon general interests (p. 173);
(b) utilitarian pertinence, that is, applicability in the concrete situations
of study and intervention (p. 174);
(c) epistemic relevance of the obtained knowledge, appraised under cri-
teria such as novelty, originality, non-redundancy and generality or uni-
versality (p. 174-5).
These criteria, which can incorporate various epistemic and non-epistemic val-
ues, are deployed in experts’ evaluations of protocols in order that the theories pro-
duced in the research will derive from robust methods, and contain useful and signifi-
cant knowledge. Lechopier makes a distinction between epistemic/cognitive and
ethical/social values that is close to Helen Longino’s distinction between the constitu-
tive and the contextual values of science (Longino, 1990, p. 4). Like her, he maintains
that although these values differ in character, they cannot be separated from one an-
other in their actual local use, where their meanings, boundaries and roles are subject
to negotiation among scientists, sometimes on political grounds and sometimes with
ambiguous connotations (Longino, 1990, p. 67, 1997). Lechopier provides examples
of this in his analyses of experts’ evaluations of protocols, where he points out the use
of values, such as originality, utility or significance of the research (p. 239-40), may
serve as cognitive values but with meanings that vary according to context.
To make a consistent articulation of the “intersection of the epistemic and the
ethical [values]” (p. 51), Lechopier introduces an original criterion: the periepistemic
value (valeur périépistémique). On one hand, epistemic values must be expressed in “a
founding intentionality authentically scientific” (p. 259) in order to justify the use of
personal data and to guarantee the dignity of people involved in an experiment (p. 74).
Hence, the epistemic or constitutive values of a research project have to be structured
by a scientific intention or aim to produce sound knowledge (p. 245). On the other
hand, experts have to consider ethical values in order to balance “risks (predictable or
not)” and “benefits (probable)” of a project (p. 262). In this sense, both epistemic and
ethical values must be considered in a protocol of research, but the scientific hypoth-
esis cannot be elaborated a posteriori for the sake of justifying a social or contextual
interest. Since the main objective of developing a research project is to produce scien-
tific knowledge, social or contextual interests must never precede or predominate over
cognitive ones (at least in a logical sense). The periepistemic value, however, points to
a boundary around epistemic ones, delimiting the scope of an investigation; “it is
‘around’ epistemic and non-epistemic criteria and (...) it constitutes the link [between
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those criterion] in the core of evaluation” (p. 254). A research protocol has periepiste-
mic value insofar as it is judged to have a proper balance of the epistemic and the ethi-
cal incorporated into its design, consistent with the relation it articulates between the
means (research activities) and ends (epistemic values or to obtain sound/scientific
knowledge) of the project, considering the ethical context in which the research project
is developed.
Thus, periepistemic value serves to demarcate science from pseudo-science,
appraising the epistemic intentionality of a particular research project to produce ra-
tional knowledge in a certain social configuration. However, the means to reach the
epistemic goals of scientific research is to follow methodological rules, since it is
not “the indifferent application of techniques to collect and analyze empirical data”
(p. 250). The epistemic and the ethical values must be articulated, then, to produce
useful knowledge to relevant matters – considering that “useful” and “relevant” are
value laden terms – and scientists should have a disposition to attain this goal. How
this goal and the appropriate balance of the epistemic and the ethical are identified
will reflect the intentions and interests of a particular investigation. Then, given that
epidemiology is an applied science that searches for useful truths, in its actual scien-
tific practices there is always a spiral of mutual adjustments. This “spiral of retroac-
tion” (p. 262) involves the epistemic and ethical values, responsive to the periepiste-
mic value of a scientific inquiry (that may be appraised differently, depending on the
intentions and interests of investigators), which “delimits from the beginning [with
the adoption of a strategy of research] a field of possible researches” (p. 262).
Lechopier adopts what he calls a holistic approach to science, which has much in
common with Hugh Lacey’s idea that scientific research is conducted under a strategy,
which defines the characteristics of a scientific research project at the outset, con-
straining the admissible kinds of theories and selecting the domain of phenomena that
will be investigated (Lacey, 1999). When scientists define or adopt a strategy, a per-
spective of epistemic and social values also has to be adopted, and the objectives of
research have to be delineated in the light of them. In Lechopier’s perspective, ethical
and epistemic values are inseparable and have dialectical interactions with one an-
other at all moments of scientific activity (p. 244, 264-6). Unlike Lacey (and like
Longino), he does not separate the moment of the adoption of strategy and from that of
the cognitive appraisal of theory, a moment at which there should be no legitimate role
for values other than epistemic ones.
The evaluation of a protocol, then, involves more than appraisal of its scienti-
fic methodological quality; it is made in the value-laden arena of scientific ethos
(p. 202-4). What is authentic research can only be demarcated from pseudo-science
when, in order to justify the development of a research project, experts identify a “guid-
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ing question” (p. 253) which must be oriented by epistemic values that are articulated
with ethical considerations by the periepistemic value of a research project to produce
sound theories. We saw above that a balance must be sought in authentic research be-
tween epistemic and ethical considerations (and not the subordination of one to the
other) and that, in both the production and the evaluation of protocols of research,
epistemic and ethical values are both essentially involved (cf. chapter 7). A scientific
ethos is constituted by this dialectic of the epistemic and ethical values. In it, the
periepistemic value and, hence, the authenticity of a research project is determined:
the work of demarcation done by the experts of the cctirs cannot be done without
their methodological qualifications or their knowledge of their scientific fields
and the contexts of application. But cognitive [values] and axiological [ethical]
references are joined to form a criterion that permits to unmask those “researches
that are not researches”, those “simulacra of research” (p. 253).
Since how authentic science is demarcated from what is not reflects a scientific
ethos, experts – depending on the intentions and interests informing an investigation
– may differ in their judgments concerning demarcation. Lechopier illustrates this
with an example in which two experts of cctirs gave different verdicts, different ap-
praisals of the periepistemic value, of the same protocol of research. The protocol con-
cerned an inquiry into the effects of a particular antipsychotic drug on the socialization
of schizophrenic patients (p. 246), whose objective was to evaluate the impact of treat-
ment with this drug on patients’ social autonomy over a period of six months. The ex-
perts apparently agreed that the protocol met the methodological and epistemic con-
ditions necessary for being considered authentic research. One of them attested that
the inquiry had an appropriate epistemic aim of understanding the impact of a treat-
ment. The second expert testified, however, that the epistemic aims were subordinated
to non-epistemic ones, since (in his judgment) the central goal of the study was to do
market research and gain publicity for the drug so that it would be prescribed more
frequently (p. 247-8). According to him, “the hypothesis was set up a posteriori to serve
as ‘scientific’ cover for collecting these data [from patients], in a typical ‘inverse con-
struction’” (p. 248), and so he concluded that the research proposed in the protocol is
not authentically scientific and that it incorporates a conflict of interests.
This example clearly illustrates the importance of considering the ethical, social
and contextual interests of scientific research, instead of evaluating only its epistemic
and methodological virtues – and also that judgments of periepistemic value are not
always shared by all members of a committee. In it, different experts gave diametri-
cally opposed verdicts on the very same protocol of research, indicating that they did
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not appraise the balance of cognitive and ethical intentions of the protocol using the
same criteria. Experts need to scrutinize the guiding question of a given scientific re-
search project in order to grasp its intentions, and to appraise whether they justify
conducting the investigation. The project is legitimate and worthy of pursuit, provided
that it incorporates a genuine epistemic motivation and ethical commitments that are
in accordance with society’s interests and aims. Although the experts did not share the
same periepistemic criterion, they shared the same scientific ethos, that is, the same
goals, epistemic and social values, and ethical rules of production of epidemiological
knowledge; yet, they gave different verdicts on the same protocol, exemplifying the
conflicting character of evaluations in specific situations.
3 Militant epistemology: the ethical dimension of scientific ethos
Lechopier maintains that he is offering a philosophical, historical and ethnographical
analysis of a scientific committee (p. 22, 229) and, certainly, his analyses of cctirs’s
decision-making processes go far beyond ethnographic “fieldwork” (p. 21). Each of
the book’s ten chapters display the acuteness of his observations, his detailed analyses
of the disciplinary layers of epidemiology, and his ability to recreate the committee’s
history and to reconstruct the underlying structure of the values that are incorporated
into its deliberations and decisions. Although the investigation concerns epidemiol-
ogy, readers will not have difficulty in extracting more general epistemological and ethi-
cal conclusions that apply also to other disciplines.
In this way, Lechopier’s work displays a “militant rationality” (p. 280): the mak-
ing of a scientific ethos occurs concomitantly with engaging in scientific practices. In
this ethos or “habitat”, scientists must find rules oriented by the epistemic and ethical
values and the objectives, which will determine the legitimacy of scientific research.
The tension between local and generalizable knowledge produces a dialectical articu-
lation between contingent and universal inquiries, conducting research that incorpo-
rates not only impartial observation but also local action. In this sense, an epistemo-
logical “militancy” can be interpreted as a rationality that is inscribed in a social,
contingent world that poses for scientific investigation constantly changing questions
that need to be investigated under a plurality of admissible methods. Scientific ethos,
then, is a space for rational wandering but also for social transformation.
 The book goes beyond two opposing viewpoints: that, despite the multiple in-
terests that motivate research, science can impartially evaluate its hypotheses and pro-
duce objective knowledge; and that, because science and the applications of its prod-
ucts are socially situated, its results embody social relativism, so that no particular
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protocol of research can be defended as neutral, worthy of support regardless of the
ethical point of view that is held. By identifying a scientific ethos as an integral compo-
nent of scientific practices, Lechopier is able to claim that “there are social conditions
for the production of knowledge that satisfy epistemic and ethical values better than
others do” (p. 282). The ethical dimension of scientific ethos, then, is not only an in-
stitutional imperative to control the character of scientific activity, as in Merton’s analy-
sis. For, according to the author’s argument, there are no permanent, immutable cri-
teria for making epistemological and ethical judgments about a hypothesis: scientists
cannot evaluate the methodology of a research project, in view of the ethic and epistemic
values embodied in it, without considering its context (p. 164). Therefore, the signifi-
cance of scientific research should be open to democratic debate (p. 240), permeable
to contextual justification, with a militant rationality. As the Greek ethos was a habitat
that gives identity and well-being, the scientific ethos of Les valeurs de la recherche also
has its own virtues and aims that do not permit keeping ethical considerations out of
scientists’ decisions and responsibilities.
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